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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Jeffrey H. Smith*
This afternoon, I want to touch briefly on a number of issues rather
than discuss one or two to death. I chose this approach because it seemed
an appropriate way to open a conference. I also chose it because I hope I
can convince you that intelligence and international law interact in a way
that simultaneously strengthens the law and improves intelligence; that
law matters, especially in time of war; and that both good intelligence
and good law have one common core value: integrity. So that you will
have a sense of the perspective that I bring to this, I should begin with a
very brief history of how I got into the intelligence business.
As the Dean mentioned, I graduated from the law school in 1971. I
was in the Army at the time, and I wound up, through good fortune, as
the Pentagon's lawyer for the Panama Canal negotiations. So, literally,
eighteen months after sitting in one of these seminar rooms with then-
Professor Bill Bishop taking a seminar in international law, I was help-
ing draft the Panama Canal Treaty. It was quite an experience. But I
quickly learned then how valuable intelligence was to support U.S. for-
eign policy objectives.
In 1975 I resigned from the Army and joined the Legal Adviser's of-
fice at the Department of State as the Department's lawyer for the
Congressional investigations of the American intelligence community
that grew out of the Watergate scandal. You will recall that some of the
Watergate burglars were former CIA officers, and that President Nixon
sought to use the CIA and overstated assertions of national security to
quash the investigations. Congress then investigated the CIA and the rest
of the intelligence community. America did not like much of what it saw:
assassination attempts, overseas coups, warrantless wiretaps, exploding
cigars, and so on.
Those were exciting days for a young lawyer, but my colleagues and
I at the Department of State thought that the focus on intelligence issues
would only last for a year or so, because surely no lawyers would need
to be worried about intelligence issues once the investigations were over.
How wrong we were. Judge Baker knows that very well. These investi-
gations led President Ford to sign the nation's first executive order
setting forth the basic rules governing American intelligence activities in
1976.' Congress enacted a series of laws that govern the intelligence
* Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP; former General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency (May 1995-Sept. 1996).
1. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
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community to this day. These include the Intelligence Oversight Act,2 the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA,3 and a law requiring a
written presidential finding that must be reported to Congress prior to
the commencement of covert action.' The two congressional oversight
committees were also established.
As intelligence work continued to grow, I wound up spending eight
years at the State Department, including being the first assistant legal
adviser for law enforcement and intelligence. As the Dean said, I then
went to the Hill as General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services
Committee under Sam Nunn, subsequently joined Arnold & Porter, later
went to the CIA, and then back to Arnold & Porter.
And having been actively involved in issues of law and intelligence
for some thirty-two years, what do I make of it all? As for international
law, most lawyers would likely scoff at the notion that espionage activi-
ties are constrained in any meaningful way by international law. Indeed,
most probably believe that international law's only influence on espio-
nage is that in wartime, spies caught behind the lines out of uniform can
be shot. Hardly a sophisticated or, to intelligence services, comforting
notion.
But I believe there is a great deal of interaction between interna-
tional law and intelligence activities. To begin, virtually every state has
an intelligence service that seeks to collect information on potential ad-
versaries. These collection activities frequently violate the municipal (or
domestic) law of other states. However, because espionage is such a fix-
ture in international affairs, it is fair to say that the practice of states
recognizes espionage as a legitimate function of the state, and therefore
it is legal as a matter of customary international law. Evidence of that is
that when intelligence officers are accused of operating under diplomatic
cover in an embassy, they are nearly always declared personae non
gratae and sent home. In exercising the right to "PNG" a diplomat, the
receiving state typically says their activities were inconsistent with dip-
lomatic activities. I can recall no instance in which a receiving state has
said that these activities violate international law.
That international law acknowledges the collection of intelligence by
clandestine means, at least as viewed by the United States, can also be
seen through Congress' reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in the
1972 Keith case, holding that warrantless electronic surveillance in the
2. Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981-
82 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2000)).
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified in scattered sections at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2000)).
4. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (2000).
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United States for domestic intelligence purposes was unconstitutional
That case, by the way, originated when a person on campus named
"Pun" Plamondon put a bomb outside the CIA office here in Ann Arbor.
It turns out he was wiretapped without a warrant, which he challenged in
court. Eventually the case went all the way to the Supreme Court, and
they threw it out-another connection between intelligence and Ann Ar-
bor. That case led Congress to enact the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which does require a warrant before the government
may engage in electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence in
the United States. Or at least we thought a warrant was required before
learning about the President's "Terrorist Surveillance Program." We can
talk about that later if you wish.
But in considering FISA in 1978, Congress was worried that direct-
ing electronic surveillance at foreign diplomatic establishments in the
United States would violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions and the inviolability of diplomatic missions. In response, the
executive branch prepared a list of states that had targeted U.S. diplo-
matic installations overseas either with electronic surveillance or
physical intrusion. As you might imagine that list was very long. But it
satisfied Congress that this was such a widely accepted practice of states
that, although not specifically authorized by the Vienna Convention, one
could hardly argue violated the Convention, since everybody was doing
it.
So, if espionage activities-that is to say the collection of intelli-
gence-are consistent with, or at least tolerated by, international law,
what activities are prohibited? The first that comes to mind is a covert
action, which is a secret action by one state to influence the conduct of
another state. One of the fundamental tenets of international law is, of
course, that one state not intervene in the internal affairs of another state.
It may be a fundamental principle, but it is also fairly tattered. States
seek to influence each other daily. Sometimes this is done by economic
sanctions, or by international political pressure. Most of that activity is
clearly legal, although the state that is the target of the efforts almost
always says that it is not.
But it is difficult to argue, absent some extraordinary circumstances,
that a covert paramilitary effort to overthrow another government is con-
sistent with international law. I should add at this point that the
overwhelming number of covert actions carried out by the United States
in the last few years, and indeed the last few decades, have not been de-
signed to overthrow another state. Far more typically, they provide very
5. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
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necessary but secret support to an existing government by, for example,
specialized training in counterterrorism or counternarcotics. However,
this does not prevent many around the world from believing that the CIA
has a hand in everything from mad cow disease to global warming. I can
assure you that it has no role in either. I can also tell you that the CIA has
cleared this entire Address. I was hoping they would take a lot more out
and I could hold up a sheet with lots of redactions-but they let it go
through.
As I mentioned, American law requires that before the president can
engage in covert action, he must make a written "finding" that the activ-
ity is important to national security, and that finding must be reported in
advance to the congressional oversight committees. Such a finding is
required whether it is merely secret assistance to a friendly government
by U.S. intelligence agencies or a full-scale effort to effect regime
change, to use a term currently in vogue.
It is a curiosity of our legal history that findings and notice to Con-
gress are required even in the most minor of covert actions, whereas no
such requirement governs the use of our military forces. The War Powers
Resolution of 1973,6 which requires the president to notify Congress
when he deploys forces and provides that they are to be withdrawn
within sixty days unless Congress authorizes otherwise, has become
toothless. Although Congress authorized the Gulf War in 1990 and the
invasion of Iraq in 2003, no congressional authority or advance notice is
necessary in order for the president to move military forces around the
globe or to engage in very aggressive military activities. These activities,
which can carry great risk of deeper U.S. involvement than covert ac-
tions, are often characterized as "preparation of the battlefield," because
this activity requires-and think for a minute of the President's recent
decision to deploy another carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf-no
congressional notice. Nothing is required, and perhaps that is right, but
contrast that to what is required every time the CIA wants to send an old
copying machine somewhere overseas.
Because this activity-the "preparation of the battlefield" by the
military-is typically carried out in close collaboration with the U.S.
intelligence community, executive branch lawyers and members of Con-
gress often develop headaches trying to decide whether a particular
activity falls under Title 10 of the United States Code, which is the part
of the code governing military activities,7 and hence requires no presi-
dential finding and no notice to Congress, or whether it is carried out
6. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d
Cong. (1973).
7. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-1805 (2000).
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under Title 50, which governs the intelligence community and does re-
quire a presidential finding and notice to Congress.8 You can imagine
that the inclination of the executive branch is always to conclude that a
proposed action is a military action that requires no finding and no no-
tice to Congress. Surely no rational government would organize itself
that way, but here we are.
This dichotomy between Title 10 and Title 50 presents even more
difficult problems when it comes to activities in the cyberworld and in
space, which are increasingly vital to the conduct of military, intelli-
gence, and diplomatic activities. As you know, international law is not
very well-developed with respect to activities in space or the cyberworld.
A host of questions are presented, including what law governs outer
space and cyberspace, who has jurisdiction, which U.S. agencies are au-
thorized to do what. A recent Chinese demonstration of their ability to
use a ground-based system to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite raises a
number of very difficult legal, political, technical, and strategic issues.
Do traditional international legal principles apply to activities in the cy-
berworld and in space? These are not easy questions to answer, and they
become even more difficult when one factors in intelligence activities.
Are existing laws adequate, or are new laws needed that are based on old
principles?
The relationship between intelligence and international law is also
raised by President Bush's new strategy, commonly known as the Pre-
emption Doctrine. That doctrine holds, as I am sure you know, that the
United States may engage in unilateral military activity against another
state or political group, without waiting to respond to an armed attack-
for example, to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons. The doc-
trine, in my view, raises very serious questions under international law.
To be sure, there is a right of self-defense and the United States has long
argued, very quietly, that it may be necessary in some rare circumstances
to shoot first. For example, we have never renounced the first use of nu-
clear weapons. However, the President's doctrine goes much further than
previous U.S. positions on self-defense, and is premised on the idea that
in the wake of 9/11 there is a new world requiring new rules. I am not so
sure about that. But I am certain that any preemptive action would be
valid only to the extent that the intelligence information justifying the
strike was overwhelming and indisputable. Such certainty in intelligence
is very rare, as we have tragically seen in the case of Iraq.
Issues similar to those raised by intelligence activities in space and
the cyberworld, namely whether existing laws are adequate, are raised by
the attacks of 9/11. The President was correct, in my view, to regard
8. See 50 U.S.C. § 413(b).
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many existing laws, both domestic and international, as outdated when it
came to responding to terrorist attacks. The President was wrong, how-
ever, to conclude therefore that he could act on his own, without asking
Congress to amend the law, or in the case of international law, without
consulting our allies and seeking to develop consensus on modernizing
the laws of war.
For example, then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales famously
characterized the Geneva Conventions as "quaint, ' and advised that we
were therefore free to ignore them. Would it not have been much better
to begin immediate discussions with our allies about how the Conven-
tions should be updated? That would not in my view have prevented the
United States from seizing Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan
and either imprisoning them while awaiting trial or, if they had commit-
ted no criminal acts, from detaining them as prisoners of war. We should
also have sought to amend the statute of the Court in The Hague," so
that those who violated international law by attacking us could be
brought to justice, as we did in the case of the Balkans and Rwanda.
How much better would it be if the detainees in Guantdnamo were held
under some sort of international agreement of the coalition partners,
rather than unilaterally by the United States?
In creating a new and previously unknown category of "unlawful en-
emy combatants," the President acted outside the scope of international
law, and caused enormous harm to the United States. As has been widely
reported, he ignored the advice of military officers, JAG officers, and
career lawyers at the Department of State who had been guardians of the
United States' leadership at the Geneva Conventions since World War II.
William Taft IV, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State under Sec-
retary Colin Powell, speaking last spring at the Yale Law School,
described how ideologically driven lawyers had hijacked the process. He
said, and this is a long quote so bear with me:
Bearing an abstract hostility to international law, developed in
the sheltered environment of academic journals, and equally un-
familiar and unconcerned with our broader policy interests in
promoting respect for the rule of law, among states as well as
within them, these lawyers proposed to create a regime in which
detainees were deprived of all legal rights, and the conditions of
their treatment were a matter of unreviewable executive discre-
tion. Why lawyers, of all people, should want to establish the
9. Internal memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George
W. Bush, President of the United States (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek/.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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point that such a lawless regime could legally exist, even as a
theoretical matter, much less recommend that one actually be
created, is, I confess, beyond me, and in itself is a sad commen-
tary on the extent to which sophistry has penetrated what used to
be widely regarded as an honorable and learned profession."
Tough stuff from the great-grandson of the only man to serve as both
President and as Chief Justice of the United States.
The President also acted in violation of U.S. law as far as the Su-
preme Court is concerned. Indeed, the courts and Congress are
beginning to roll back some of the President's asserted authority. For
example, last October Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act,'
2
which sets up procedures to try some of the detainees in Guantdnamo,
affords very limited rights for other detainees to challenge their deten-
tion and, under intense pressure from the White House, creates two
standards for the treatment of detainees. The first standard is for the mili-
tary, which will be governed by the Army Field Manual-long the
official U.S. interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. The second is a
set of standards to be drafted by the President in an executive order that
has not yet been issued and that would apply to the CIA. I am deeply
troubled by that.
I do not believe that there should be two standards for the U.S.
treatment of detainees. Two standards create confusion in the field, and
confusion was clearly a major contributing factor to the abuses of Abu
Ghraib. Moreover, if the President truly believes the CIA needs to be
more aggressive in order to elicit vital information for our national secu-
rity, shouldn't the military also be able to use those same techniques?
Does the President believe that the military is entitled to worse informa-
tion than the CIA? Why should the CIA be asked to undertake risky
behavior without knowing whether, when the political winds shift in
Washington, they will once again be left out on a limb?
Congress should revisit this, hold hearings on what are effective in-
terrogation techniques, and consider enacting them into law. I should
say, by the way, that a distinguished scientific advisory body to the
American intelligence community just issued a report saying that there is
no valid scientific support for the notion that aggressive interrogation
11. William H. Taft IV, Keynote Address at the Yale Journal of International Law Young
Scholars Conference, View from the Top: American Perspectives on International Law After
the Cold War (Mar. 4, 2006), reprinted in 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 503 (2006).
12. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 801,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd-2000dd-1 (2006)).
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techniques produce anything useful.'" Congress should take that report
into its consideration.
I also believe that Congress should examine the matter of renditions,
that is, the practice of moving individuals from one state to another to
stand trial or be interrogated or imprisoned without going through the
formal extradition process. In my opinion, renditions can be valuable
tools for law enforcement and intelligence. The United States has done
many over the years, before 9/11, and it worked very well, including get-
ting the terrorist Carlos out of Sudan and back to Paris where he stood
trial. In my opinion, they can be very valuable, but they should be used
only in very rare circumstances and when certain criteria have been met.
Surely no state should ever send a individuals to another state knowing
that they will be tortured, or without adequate assurances that basic hu-
man rights and due process will be respected, a commitment by the way
we have already undertaken by becoming a party to the Convention
Against Torture.' 4 Recent investigations by Germany and Italy of rendi-
tions carried out by individuals alleged to be CIA officers point out the
critical need to agree upon appropriate legal bases for renditions.
Why does all this matter? As lawyers, we instinctively say because
it's the law. But one cannot merely say to cabinet officers or to the presi-
dent, "you cannot do that because it will violate international law," and
expect them to immediately scuttle some wild misadventure they were
considering. The challenge is to persuade political leaders that not only
will a proposed action violate international law, but also that if we do it
the consequences will ultimately make us weaker, not stronger-that the
short-term gain will be outweighed by the long-term harm.
Why? Because the United States cannot act alone. We need help to
solve virtually every international legal problem we face. Other govern-
ments and their people care about international law. They care about
maintaining the United Nations. They care about the Geneva Conven-
tions. They care about playing by the rules. They understand that these
rules, developed over many years, protect us all. And when the United
States flouts these rules, as many nations believe we have, it makes it far
more difficult for them to cooperate with us on other challenges we face.
Also, there will come a time when the United States seeks to invoke in-
ternational law. And we cannot flout it on Monday and invoke it on
Tuesday.
13. INTELLIGENCE Sci. BD., EDUCING INFORMATION: INTERROGATION: SCIENCE AND
ART-FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/dni/educing.pdf.
14. Convention against Torture and Other Crel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered
into force June 26, 1987).
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As I said at the outset of my remarks, there is one issue that runs
consistently through all of these issues, and that is integrity. It may seem
odd to say that integrity is as essential to the intelligence process as it is
to the legal process, but I believe it to be true. The fundamental role of
intelligence in the formulation and execution of policy is to establish
ground truth, and to speak truth to power. Said another way, it is to main-
tain the integrity of the process. And by that I mean the job of
intelligence officers is to provide the facts to the policymakers, so that
they understand the consequences of different courses of action. Intelli-
gence officers, who live in a world of deception and denial and secrecy,
must be scrupulous in reporting the facts as they understand them to the
policymakers. The Director of National Intelligence must have the cour-
age to say, "Mr. (or perhaps Madame) President, your policy has failed."
As you know, under our system there is supposed to be a bright line
between those who provide intelligence and those who make policy,
rather like separation of church and state. Unfortunately, that separation
has not always been sufficiently maintained, and every time it has been
breached, we have paid a heavy price. The most recent example is the
failure with respect to weapons of mass destruction prior to the invasion
of Iraq. Whether that was a result of poor tradecraft on the part of the
analysts or political pressure from the White House is debatable. My
own view is that it is some of each, but at its base it is a failure of integ-
rity.
In the intelligence business, secrecy is critical. We use deception to
protect our most vital secrets, and we employ deception to acquire or, as
George Tenet was fond of saying, "steal" the vital secrets of others. But
intelligence officers live in a world of secrecy, and it is often as the nov-
elists say, a world of mirrors where the truth is hard to find. Secrecy is
seductive, and can be corrosive. It tempts those who operate in the secret
world to cover up wrongdoing or to believe that things done in secret are
more important than things done in the open. The current film The Good
Shepherd deals as well with the corrosive effect of long-term secrecy as
well as anything I have seen. The challenge is to use deception and se-
crecy, but assure that the end result is honest, that is, that the integrity of
the process is maintained. I know of no other profession that uses dis-
honest behavior to achieve honest results. And that puts a special burden
on the integrity and quality of people in the intelligence community, in-
cluding their lawyers, to ensure that the game stays honest.
If one sets aside the secrecy, deception and false beards, lawyers
have much the same responsibility in our broader society. We have an
obligation as officers of the court to ensure that the law is enforced-that
the system works. We often have to tell our clients things they do not
Spring 2007]
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want to hear, to speak truth to power. And getting the headstrong CEO of
a company not to do something that may be illegal can sometimes be just
as challenging as getting a cabinet officer not to violate international law.
Trust me on that one. In a democracy, it is the law that ensures the play-
ing field is level, the rights of minorities are protected, and that elections
are fair. In other words, the law ensures the integrity of the process.
Lawyers and judges have a special responsibility to make the system
work. If our integrity fails, the system fails. If the system fails, our coun-
try fails.
If I have learned one thing in all of these years, it is that the single
most important thing that anybody in the intelligence business or in the
law can do, is work as hard as we can every day to ensure the integrity of
the process. I learned that here in this great law school. My only hope,
and I do not think I understood it until I had to struggle with these issues,
is that I have lived up to the ideals and standards that I learned here.
Thank you very much.
